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ABSTRACT
After violent conflicts, international actors face difficult choices about 
whether and how to provide assistance. These decisions can have 
immense consequences. As aid always occurs under conditions of scar-
city, theoretical reflection is crucial to reveal the opportunity costs and 
potential tensions between alternative courses of action. Yet there has 
been relatively little scholarly reflection on what should constitute pri-
orities for post-conflict assistance and why. This paper advances this 
debate by comparing two very different areas of assistance that both 
embody compelling values and goals: public health and transitional 
justice. It argues that aid for public health deserves greater attention 
based on powerful normative considerations and its impressive empir-
ical record. It also suggests the need to examine not only clearly under-
performing areas, but also tough cases. Transitional justice, despite its 
strong normative foundations, faces challenges and limitations that 
justify reform and a reconsideration of the emphasis commonly placed 
on it. Our intention is not to suggest that long-standing commitments 
ought to be abandoned or that all aid should be allocated to health. 
Rather, by scrutinising the priorities of international assistance, we hope 
to start a general discussion about how the international community 
can best help societies heal after conflict.
Introduction
When violent conflict ceases, international policymakers face stark choices. Amidst over-
whelming social and political needs, decisions must be taken that will have immense con-
sequences. What should international assistance following conflict prioritise? These 
post-conflict decisions can be a matter of life or death for millions of people worldwide, 
dramatically impacting the quality of life of millions more. But practical constraints abound 
in even the most well-funded stabilisation and reconstruction efforts: resources are always 
scarce and tough choices inevitable. In these settings, theoretical reflection is crucial to bring 
out into the open potential tensions and opportunity costs.
Despite the considerable practical importance of these choices, there is relatively little 
scholarly reflection on what should constitute priorities for post-conflict assistance and why. 
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Donor governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) provide a broad array of assistance after conflict, ranging from formal aid programmes 
to funding for local or international initiatives, in-kind support, infrastructure and technical 
expertise. There are many pressing needs. Resources – money, time, human and political 
capital – are always scarce. Trade-offs are inevitable as ‘a decision to fund one project is a 
decision not to use the same resources elsewhere’ (Clements 2020, 2). In recent years, aggre-
gate foreign aid has decreased, thereby increasing overall scarcity (Gulrajani 2017, 376), and 
the COVID-19 global pandemic has further strained aid budgets.1 In light of these facts, each 
potential course of action has to be judged not only in light of its benefits – that is, by the 
extent to which it is successful in aiding post-conflict reconstruction – it also has to be 
assessed in light of its opportunity costs – that is, in relation to other possible, but forgone, 
interventions.2
Drawing on opportunity-cost considerations, we suggest that investments in public 
health are one example of assistance that deserve more international attention. health aid 
rests on powerful normative considerations and has shown the ability to dramatically 
improve people’s lives after conflict, often at relatively low costs. Yet ‘except in countries of 
strategic or political interest to donors’, haar and Rubinstein note, ‘donor investment in 
[post-conflict] states remains low even as global health spending has dramatically increased’ 
(haar and Rubenstein 2012, 2). At the same time, taking opportunity cost seriously justifies 
reform and potentially a partial reconfiguration of international priorities away from areas 
that are performing less well. We focus on a particularly tough case: transitional justice. While 
efforts to confront the past have become a ‘permanent feature’ and ‘essential component’ 
of post-conflict transitions (Andrieu 2010, 538), these efforts have frequently failed to meet 
expectations. And ‘justice is not cheap’, as Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), once put it (BBC News 2003). As Baylis 
notes, ‘hundreds of millions of dollars are spent each year supporting ad hoc tribunals, trials 
in national courts, commissions, reparations, and rule of law initiatives in transitioning coun-
tries’ (Baylis 2017, 371). The united Nations (uN)-backed Special Court for Sierra leone 
(2002–2013), for example, cost roughly uS$300 million (Gberi 2014). The health Sector 
Reconstruction and Development Project (2001–2009), by contrast, received $28 million in 
World Bank grants to improve health outcomes in a country with some of the world’s highest 
maternal and child mortality rates (World Bank 2010). Although transitional justice efforts 
in Sierra leone delivered some significant achievements – including the conviction of former 
liberian president Charles Taylor – it could be argued that even this relative success has 
done little to ‘fundamentally [change] the daily lives of Sierra leoneans who still grapple 
with the aftermath of war’ (hoffman 2008, 131).
Our intention is not to suggest that all long-standing commitments ought to be aban-
doned or that all support for all types of transitional justice, let alone all post-conflict aid, 
should be allocated exclusively to health. Rather, by scrutinising existing priorities and high-
lighting a promising avenue of post-conflict assistance, we hope to start a general discussion 
about how the international community can best help societies heal after violent conflict. 
Although international assistance can be politicised and pursued for non-altruistic motives,3 
donors have repeatedly pledged to make their aid more effective and beneficial for recipients 
(OeCD 2005, 2008). Our goal, in part, is to help provide practical insights into how these 
stated commitments can be best fulfilled.
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The argument is developed in five sections. First, we begin by suggesting that investments 
in public health deserve more international attention in post-conflict settings. In the second 
section, we turn our focus to transitional justice, which currently constitutes a major inter-
national priority. Transitional justice rests on powerful normative foundations, but has a 
mixed tracked record, while taking up significant resources. In the third section, we sketch 
different plausible evaluative criteria by which to make comparative judgements about areas 
of assistance as different as public health and transitional justice, and argue that these criteria 
support our argument. The fourth section considers potential objections: the fact that there 
is no unitary world agent that can reconfigure assistance priorities; the notion that goals 
such as public health and transitional justice are incommensurable; and the idea that inter-
national donors should have full discretion over how they provide assistance. We argue that 
none of these objections succeed in undermining our more general argument, which we 
summarise in the final section.
Rebuilding health and health systems
While it is beyond the scope or intention of this paper to offer a detailed analysis of the 
entire scope of post-conflict assistance, it is clear that the international community as a 
whole can place greater or lesser emphasis on interventions in certain areas. In this section, 
we highlight the benefits of public health assistance and argue it deserves more interna-
tional support. It is worth stressing, however, that multiple legitimate goals exist. Perhaps 
most obviously, one crucial priority for any enduring post-conflict order is the promotion 
of a state that has both the legitimacy and the authority to establish a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force to prevent a return to violence (Swenson 2017). Other critical goals 
include, but are not limited to, the creation and rebuilding of essential infrastructure; the 
development of democracy; relatively just legal and taxation systems; the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants; and the promotion of sustained 
inclusive development (Ghani and lockhart 2009). The emphasis lies on empirically informed 
pluralism of assistance, rather than on a reductionist focus on a single priority.
Why, then, dwell on health? health illustrates the need to (re-)examine international 
priorities particularly well. While health has not been a major international priority after 
conflict (Rubenstein 2011), assistance in this area shows great promise. The rationale for 
supporting public health in post-conflict settings rests on particularly strong normative 
foundations. One of the most immediate and dramatic manifestations of violent conflict 
is the burden of disease and death it produces. This burden is not limited to the casualties 
among combatants: it endures long after the armed conflict comes to a close, and it is 
borne overwhelmingly by civilians (Ghobarah, huth, and Russett 2004) and dispropor-
tionately by women (Plümper and Neumayer 2006). It is widely held, for instance, that 
the indirect toll on public health in the aftermath of war is about as large as or larger than 
that directly incurred during the conflict (Ghobarah, huth, and Russett 2004; hoeffler 
and Reynal-Querol 2003). The causal mechanisms are manifold. For one thing, armed 
conflict diverts human and financial resources away from the health sector, and towards 
military ends. healthcare professionals may be enlisted, killed or forced to migrate, 
thereby causing a ‘brain-drain’ effect. The migration of large groups fleeing violence 
facilitates the spread of infectious diseases like measles or malaria. Another factor is the 
destruction of the health infrastructure during war (Iqbal 2006). Through these and other 
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mechanisms, the trauma and disease inflicted by war linger for decades after the cessation 
of violence.
health has a dramatic impact on both the duration and quality of human life. It is a pro-
foundly urgent and compelling need. health is not only a human right – a right owed to 
every person simply by virtue of their humanity (uN General Assembly 1948) – its protection 
and promotion are central to any just society. Disease and disability limit people’s ability to 
pursue their individual projects in life. like the distribution of income, wealth, jobs and other 
goods, health is a component of social justice; access to health services is a hallmark of a 
just society (Sen 2004).
health is also an area where international aid has been shown to be effective in modest 
but significant ways. As Valentino has argued, ‘international public health programs are 
almost certainly the most cost effective way to save lives abroad’ (Valentino 2011, 69). Indeed, 
the most cost-effective programmes aimed at addressing preventable diseases ‘can save 
lives for as little as $3000 to $4000’ (Oberman 2019, 198). A whole host of high-impact, low-
cost and effective internationally backed health interventions exist (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 
41–70; Valentino 2011, 68–9). At the micro level, heath initiatives that have been proven 
effective through rigorous evaluation include nutritional programmes, deworming, crop 
fertilisation, hIV prevention and treatment, malaria prevention, vaccinations against disease, 
and clean water provision (Banerjee and he 2008; see also Kotsadam et al. 2018).4 At the 
macro level, health aid has been shown to reduce infant, child and maternal mortality and 
to boost overall life expectancy (Pickbourn and Ndikumana 2016; Mishra and Newhouse 
2009; Bendavid and Bhattacharya 2014; Gyimah-Brempong 2015). Nutrition aid and nutri-
tion-sensitive aid can reduce undernourishment and the proportion of children with stunted 
growth (Khalid, Gill, and Fox 2019). Aid has improved access to clean water and sanitation 
(Ndikumana and Pickbourn 2017) and reduced death from diarrhoea (Pickbourn and 
Ndikumana 2019). Research has shown that post-conflict health assistance and socio-eco-
nomic aid more generally have positive results when given for non-strategic purposes and 
states do not enjoy extensive resource rents and believe aid may be withdrawn (Girod 2015). 
Although global health assistance has grown in recent years, post-conflict states – where 
needs are often greatest – have frequently not been among the recipients. This may be due 
to a perception that aid to post-conflict states has less of a pay-off than assistance to coun-
tries with more stable governance. however, evidence suggests that with the appropriate 
safeguards, not only is effective aid possible; post-conflict states may be comparatively better 
at absorbing aid (Collier and hoeffler 2004). even if aid is not more promising in post-conflict 
settings, it appears to be at least equally promising (Yogo and Mallaye 2015; Rubenstein 
2011). While aid to different sectors and specific initiatives may have divergent impacts, 
research supports the positive impact of health aid in post-conflict settings (Donaubauer, 
herzer, and Nunnenkamp 2019, 732–3).
Country-level evidence also shows promise. For example, within a year of independence, 
post-conflict Namibia greatly reduced child mortality through the provision of immunisation 
against measles in rural regions. In addition to the intrinsic worth of improving population 
health, this policy was a ‘quick win’ that demonstrated the benefits of the transition to peace 
(Addison and Brück 2009, 11). Similarly, after over two decades of conflict, east Timor found 
its health facilities and human resource capacity devastated and often non-existent. 
International support proved essential for ‘rehabilitating’ the state-led healthcare system 
and related health gains (Alonso and Brugha 2006).
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Afghanistan endured decades of war and destruction, leaving behind a country with 
some of the world’s worst health indicators. In 2003, the Ministry of Public health cooperated 
with the World Bank, the eu and The united States Agency for International Development 
(uSAID) to design and implement a Basic Package of health Services (BPhS), with the goal 
of providing primary care to all citizens across the country, in particular the underserved 
countryside, with a primary focus on child and maternal mortality. While by no means perfect, 
the BPhS has had considerable success: in 2003 Afghanistan had a maternal mortality rate 
of 1600 per 100,000 births; by 2010 the figure was 327. Over the same period, infant mortality 
was more than halved. The BPhS programme cost around uS$5 per capita per year (around 
$175 million per year), making it one of the better funded health programmes in any 
post-conflict state (Newbrander et al. 2014).
Beyond the immediate impact of improving and often saving lives, international support 
for health and health systems can make a positive contribution to state-building and to 
establishing a more durable peace (Kruk et al. 2010; Jones et al. 2006). equally important, 
promoting access to health is widely viewed as legitimate and desirable by the people it 
seeks to help (Santa Barbara and MacQueen 2004; Kruk et al. 2010). health gains have had 
positive spillover effects into areas such as education and economic activity (Bhargava et al. 
2001; Currie and Vogl 2013). likewise, bolstering the health of the population and supporting 
the developing of health systems after conflict can enhance state efficiency, effectiveness 
and legitimacy (Brinkerhoff 2005, 6). While understandable fears exist that aid may crowd 
out domestic health initiatives, evidence suggests external spending on health tends to spur 
additional government investment by promoting a policymaking climate favourable to state 
spending on health, supporting local health actors and their advocates, and generating 
pressure for more investment in health by the state (Murdie and hicks 2013). Moreover, 
health initiatives have a demonstrated potential to make an impact even when state officials 
are not meaningfully committed to good governance (Dietrich 2011). Overall, health aid has 
been shown to have a beneficial sector-wide ability to address urgent needs, a favourable 
distributive effect and generally high levels of legitimacy, making health an especially prom-
ising area for intervention.
Aid outcomes depend on many factors and even well-designed programmes do not 
necessarily succeed. We are not suggesting that health spending will work in every context 
or that all health aid can necessarily scale up (Wilson 2011). Opportunity-cost calculations 
demand credible monitoring and evaluation to understand both the impact of aid and any 
major negative (or positive) externalities. Aid must be attuned to both the specific circum-
stances and the overarching environment.5 If conflict has restarted, aid provision in general 
is far more difficult and the risk of politicising all assistance, including health aid, increases. 
Yet considering the potential for improvement that even simple interventions represent, 
the results are encouraging and deserve more attention.
Transitional justice
There is ample evidence that aid can be ineffective. Specific foreign aid initiatives, including 
health programmes, can fail for numerous reasons (easterly 2006; Clements 2020). It is there-
fore important to be attuned to areas where aid does not live up to expectations. In 
Afghanistan, for example, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR) has identified many aid programmes that have failed to deliver their intended 
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results.6 Opportunity costs, however, are particularly useful to help illuminate what is not 
obvious. Thus, in this section we focus on a ‘tough case’ in the appraisal of the priorities of 
international assistance: transitional justice. Transitional justice is a cornerstone of interna-
tional post-conflict assistance (Teitel 2008). It also serves especially important goals and is 
underpinned by compelling normative considerations. At the same time, transitional justice 
should be examined carefully, given its prominence and the limitations of existing mecha-
nisms and their considerable opportunity costs.
The modern origins of transitional justice are rooted in ‘the post-war tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the democratisation of previously authoritarian regimes in latin 
America and the former Soviet union’ in the 1980s and 1990s (Mcevoy 2007, 411; see also 
Teitel 2003). These processes generally involved middle-income countries and, after World 
War II, advanced industrial states. In latin America and post-Communist europe, these efforts 
were primarily domestically funded and operated. Today, within the context of foreign aid, 
and particularly aid after conflict, transitional justice often involves support from donors in 
the Global North to post-conflict states primarily in the Global South.
Transitional justice can take local, national, international or hybrid forms; these processes 
can be based in state law, non-state justice or international law. It includes both punitive 
mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and restorative approaches such 
as reparations and truth and reconciliation commissions.
After conflict, transitional justice may seek to punish perpetrators, provide recompense 
to victims for past wrongs or merely ensure that truth is documented. Transitional justice 
can attempt to prevent future injustices and deter further violence, based on the logic that 
if accountability exists, no government or rebel group can commit terrible crimes with 
impunity. It can signal a break with the past as a normative rejection of the old order. 
effective justice may also allow society to heal by fostering reconciliation. As the goals of 
transitional justice can be multifaceted and often ambiguous, measuring success can pres-
ent a real challenge (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010).
As with public health aid, the normative arguments behind transitional justice are excep-
tionally powerful. Few would oppose using legal instruments to deter mass atrocities or 
punish those who perpetrate them. Indeed, most states have explicitly agreed to provisions 
in international law that require investigating and prosecuting these atrocities (even if they 
often evade that commitment in practice). More importantly, few would argue that individual 
victims and society at large do not deserve recognition, recompense and accountability for 
their suffering.
In practice, however, international support for transitional justice raises serious con-
cerns regarding how many of its mechanisms are designed and implemented – whether 
domestic, international or a hybrid of the two. Where reconciliation and political stability 
are emphasised, accountability for perpetrators may not be attempted. Truth and recon-
ciliation commissions reflect an inherent trade-off. Broadly speaking, the state fulfils its 
duty to investigate if it focuses criminal investigations on the most egregious violations 
and those responsible for them, while those who engage in truth-telling and reconstruc-
tion exercises receive amnesties or other dispensations. This occurred, for example, in 
South Africa (Gibson 2006) and Timor-leste (Kent 2012). But it is by no means clear that 
truth-telling provides relief or facilitates healing for victims (Mendeloff 2009). In some 
instances, these processes may even make matters worse for some victims, by asking 
them to relive their traumas whilst perpetrators enjoy impunity (Brounéus 2010). likewise, 
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little evidence suggests that the truth-telling process and subsequent recommendations 
actually produce the desired legal, political or social changes (Mayer-Rieckh and 
Varney 2019).
hybrid tribunals offer the appeal of not being purely international interventions, and 
they can help secure local buy-in. But they also face vexing problems, as the disappointing 
results from the first wave of hybrid tribunals show (McAuliffe 2011). historically, hybrid 
approaches have faced a greater risk of domestic political capture, and they have often 
served the ends of the state more than the victims (Ciorciari and heindel 2014). International 
support for local mechanisms appears more promising when it enjoys regime support, but 
challenges still exist. Post-conflict Rwanda embodies many of these tensions. established 
after the 1994 genocide, the so-called ‘gacaca system’ consisted of roughly 12,000 commu-
nity-based courts that tried more than one million people (Chakravarty 2016, 7). This is an 
important result. Traditionally, gacaca processes emphasised reconciliation and restoring 
communal harmony. While it drew on some pre-existing social practices and norms, it was 
novel in its handling of major crimes, the capacity to levy prison sentences and the extensive 
international support it enjoyed (uvin 2001). The process was generally seen as intelligible, 
legitimate, well-organised and effective (Clark 2010). The process also served distinctly 
non-justice goals. With international support, President Paul Kagame’s regime has used 
both the formal courts and the gacaca courts to help solidify his authoritarian rule 
(Chakravarty 2016). In short, results have been mixed as both state and non-state justice 
remain highly politicised.
In post-conflict settings, ‘the norm is for TJ [transitional justice] processes to be funded 
largely by international donors and for international technical assistance to play a strong 
role in all aspects of the process’ (Arthur and Yakinthou 2018, 1). Recent decades have seen 
international transitional justice efforts generate a ‘huge industry of lawyers, uN staffers, 
NGO activists, consultants, and fellow-traveling academics who are busy setting up tribunals 
and truth commissions’ (McCargo 2015, 6). At their worst, international justice mechanisms 
mirror rent-seeking behaviour in effect if not in intent (hayden 2011). As a lucrative, high-sta-
tus field, it can appear to be more interested in its own survival, through securing additional 
cases, than in justice (Baylis 2008).
While not uniformly bleak, the empirical record of the impact of transitional justice after 
conflict is uneven and often lacking. A commitment to transitional justice may carry import-
ant symbolic ramifications by signalling a break with past violence (Sikkink 2011). Joining 
the ICC may help deter future human rights violations by member states (Appel 2018). In 
general, however, international transitional justice initiatives have low baseline achievement 
levels. Domestic governments often have strong incentives not to participate (Kim and 
hong 2019), and the record of international efforts is even worse without regime support 
(Vinjamuri and Snyder 2015). Consequently, the individuals most likely to face trial are those 
who are out of favour with powerful states in the international community, or the victorious 
regime, or a combination thereof. International criminal mechanisms have not been an 
effective generalised deterrent in terms of individual prosecutions (Kim and hong 2019). 
even if one includes tribunals established after the fact, the vast majority of perpetrators 
face little prospect of prosecution, let alone conviction. Impunity can risk entrenching 
corrupt elites, fomenting criminality, and encouraging rent-seeking behaviour. however, 
when these mechanisms are established, they can over-promise and under-deliver, which 
risks alienating the population and furthering the perception that impunity is inevitable. 
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Punitive justice efforts can unsettle delicate political balances, which can set back efforts 
to stabilise institutions and to prevent a return to violence. Finally, even when key leaders 
are prosecuted, it may do little to address the immediate, profound human suffering result-
ing from conflict.
The potential capacity of transitional justice mechanisms to deter atrocities during ongo-
ing and future conflicts remains subject to debate. Jo and Simmons (2016), for instance, have 
argued that the prospect of ICC prosecution can mitigate the level of civilian killing provided 
that the rebel group is seeking international legitimacy. Notably, however, this a pre-conflict 
rather than post-conflict factor. When credible prosecution mechanisms exist, perverse 
incentives can follow. leaders who face credible threats of punishment upon leaving office 
have strong incentives and a demonstrated propensity to cling to power by any means 
necessary, both in general (Krcmaric 2018) and in situations of civil conflict (Prorok 2016). 
Furthermore, the threat of ICC prosecution can increase the duration and intensity of conflict 
when the risk of domestic punishment is low (Prorok 2017). These findings are echoed in 
specific case analysis. The ICC indictment against Sudanese President Al-Bahir not only dam-
aged prospects for peace, but undermined international humanitarian and peacekeeping 
endeavours (Duursma and Müller 2019). Moreover, international justice processes often 
empower ‘extremely nationalist or authoritarian elites who actively limit political opposition, 
dialogue and diversification of the political scene, hindering democratisation processes’ 
(Steflja 2018, 1675–6).
These calculations become more fraught under even a rough cost–benefit analysis. 
Transitional justice is expensive (Baylis 2017). International transitional justice mechanisms 
tend to be particularly expensive whilst producing very few convictions. In Cambodia, the 
hybrid domestic-international tribunal has cost roughly uS$300 million in international aid, 
lasted over a decade, and tried and convicted three people (Mydans 2017). The regime 
actively interfered throughout and blocked additional prosecutions. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which operated independently from the gacaca courts, 
charged 93 people and sentenced 62 (uN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals 
n.d.). The ICTR cost roughly uS$2 billion (leithead 2015). The ICC has cost well over $1.5 
billion as of the end of 2016 (Ssenyonjo 2018). In 2020, the ICC had an annual budget of 
approximately 150 million euros (ICC 2020, 6). As of April 2021, the ICC has generated a total 
of nine convictions and four acquittals (ICC 2021). In aggregate, international criminal courts 
have charged roughly 300 people, of whom fewer than 200 were ultimately adjudicated 
(Ford 2018, 184). In terms of cost, ‘international criminal courts spent more than $6 billion 
between 1993 and 2015’, which equates to ‘almost $30 million dollars per individual tried’ 
(Ford 2018, 185). Other initiatives can also carry a hefty price. In the Balkans, for example, 
efforts to identify the remains of missing persons ‘cost nearly $200 million’ (Arthur 2018, 239). 
Most recent truth commissions drew on extensive external support (hayner 2010, 216–18). 
Budgets ranged from under uS$1 million to $55 million with most falling between $5 million 
and $10 million (uSIP 2008, 12).7
As described earlier, there is a decidedly mixed record regarding their success. It is difficult, 
of course, to quantify the role that transitional justice mechanisms play in healing the wounds 
of conflict. But while international tribunals have rarely prosecuted and convicted a signif-
icant number of perpetrators, let alone a majority, they tend to require vast financial resources 
and personnel (Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010, 61–78; Mani 2008, 257).8 hayden puts the 
costs of international criminal justice into context. he notes that ‘since its founding in 1993, 
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the ICTY has handled a total of 161 defendants in a total of 103 cases, for a total budget 
(1993 to 2008/09) of $1,557,690,022, or $9,675,093 per accused’ as of 2011. The ICTY will 
have spent an estimated uS$2.3 billion, a rate that translates into roughly ‘$14,000,000 per 
accused’ (hayden 2011, 322). The ICTY is not an outlier. Jalloh estimates the ICTR spent 
roughly $26 million per case, the Special Court for Sierra leone cost $23 million per case, 
and the hybrid tribunal for Cambodia had a budget of uS$36 million per accused (Jalloh 
2011, 431–2).
International support must also be cognisant of whether it is viewed as legitimate by the 
people it seeks to help. International assistance for transitional justice is often mired in 
concerns about the legitimacy of its mechanisms. Purely domestic processes can reflect 
problematic power balances within society. legitimacy concerns are far greater, however, 
when transitional justice is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as imposed from outside with little 
say given to domestic actors. No donor country has ever been tried for complicity in human 
rights violations, which hints at the limitations of the international model (Kendall 2011). At 
the same time, among African states there has been a growing chorus of ICC criticism, active 
obstruction and even plausible threats of mass withdrawal (Mills and Bloomfield 2018). 
Transitional justice is often a significant expenditure, tends to result in few convictions, may 
create perverse incentives and may be prone to political capture, and can provoke significant 
state resistance. Given the issues we have sketched, the international community should 
think carefully whether its emphasis on transitional justice, and especially international crim-
inal justice, is warranted, and at least consider reform to improve its impact.
Making comparative assessments
It is, of course, difficult to compare areas of post-conflict assistance that pursue vastly different 
goals, over different timelines, funded by different bodies. Systematic data remains scarce. But 
that does not preclude reflection on the comparative merits of different interventions and the 
general priorities of the international community. Foreign aid resources are always scarce and, 
even before the profound disruptions caused by COVID-19, resources were becoming scarcer 
(Gulrajani 2017). Donors make choices about how and where to fund transitional justice as 
well as whether to support transitional justice over other priorities (Arthur 2018).9 Moreover, 
aid trade-offs in areas like health are not merely hypothetical. In 2020, Australia, for example, 
reduced health expenditure to Pacific states and reallocated those funds to infrastructure 
assistance even as those states continued to face ‘health crises, including a devastating measles 
outbreak, polio and drug-resistant tuberculosis’ (The Guardian 2020). Thus, strategy matters 
and allocation decisions must be cognisant of the opportunity costs of each approach.
Imagine a donor country faces the choice of contributing funds to either a transitional 
justice initiative or a basic healthcare package. let us assume, for the sake of argument, that 
the donor country is exclusively interested in achieving the best possible outcomes for the 
post-conflict society. how can a decision of this sort be made? It might be tempting to resolve 
this question through appeal to a human rights framework. In other words, the choice might 
be thought to come down to which approach guarantees the fulfilment of human rights 
most effectively. however, since rights are at stake in either intervention, an appeal to the 
promotion of human rights cannot, by itself, resolve the conflict. Alternatives must be 
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examined in light of some plausible set of normative criteria, informed by the empirical track 
record of previous initiatives in both areas.
One criterion would certainly concern the impact of alternative forms of assistance. On 
the one hand, impact refers to the consequences of a possible programme or intervention 
– that is, the degree to which it produces desirable outcomes or, when outcomes are uncer-
tain, the likelihood of success. On the other hand, impact can also refer to efficiency – that 
is, the degree to which a possible intervention produces a successful outcome in relation to 
the means invested. As outlined above, international support for transitional justice mech-
anisms has often failed to achieve their stated aims, whilst using extensive (monetary and 
non-monetary) resources. For example, as we noted, the ICTY alone has spent about uS$2.3 
billion prosecuting 161 defendants. In contrast, between 1996 and 2011, the World Bank 
committed uS$1.31 billion directly to rebuild infrastructure and to promote growth, and of 
that only ‘$25 million for the rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics’ (hayden 2011, 323). What 
makes comparisons like these striking is that public health interventions, while not guaran-
teed to succeed, have received comparatively few resources despite a particularly high 
potential for saving lives.
Another plausible criterion to compare areas of assistance is the urgency of the needs 
that are addressed. urgency describes the strength or importance of a person’s claim to 
assistance. But it may also reflect a temporal component: an urgent action is one that 
should be taken now rather than later. Many forms of international assistance address 
urgent needs in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In contrast, transitional justice mech-
anisms require many years to document abuses and prepare prosecutions, with uncertain 
results. Interventions such as childhood vaccinations or deworming, on the other hand, 
often have immediate, tangible effects. Now, of course, there are often compelling reasons 
to prioritise long-term goals over immediate needs. But if at least some priority is to be 
given to immediate needs – in particular when these are a matter of life or death – tran-
sitional justice initiatives, while important, are perhaps less urgent than other goals. Note 
that the point stands independently from considerations of impact: even successful tran-
sitional justice processes are comparatively slow and do not impact most people’s imme-
diate needs.
One could also compare areas of assistance in light of the distributive effects in the host 
society. here what matters is that the benefits of post-conflict assistance reach people in 
ways that can be considered fair or equitable. To be sure, both health interventions and 
transitional justice efforts can be designed in inequitable ways. In practice, however, this 
risk seems to loom much larger in the case of transitional justice. This is especially the case 
in domestic and hybrid mechanisms, where incentives are strong for governments to struc-
ture the process to either consolidate their power, such as in Rwanda, or to preclude any 
real accountability, such as in Cambodia. even relatively successful transitional justice mech-
anisms do little to address the socio-economic inequalities that often contribute to conflict 
in the first place. While it is also possible to design public health programmes that benefit 
only, say, particular geographic regions or ethnic groups of a country, large-scale public 
health programmes, like the BPhS in Afghanistan, can help improve the lives of disadvan-
taged groups, such as women or rural populations, and thereby reduce long-standing social 
inequalities.
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Finally, consider the legitimacy of alternative interventions, understood here in a minimal 
sense as the degree to which post-conflict assistance bolsters or undermines the credibility 
of the state to the local population. Indeed, if we adopt a victim-centred approach, the per-
spective of affected populations needs to take a crucial role in prioritisation decisions. As 
discussed before, the equitable delivery of health services and support for the development 
of health systems can contribute positively to the perception of the post-conflict state as 
legitimate. Furthermore, health interventions funded by outside donors, though by no 
means always uncontroversial, typically reflect a widespread local consensus on the impor-
tance of improving health-related quality of life. Transitional justice, on the other hand, 
commonly raises more challenging questions of legitimacy. As described before, domestic, 
international and hybrid mechanisms often reflect problematic power balances both within 
host societies and in relation to donor countries.
Admittedly, these brief remarks refer only to the general track record of transitional justice 
and health initiatives, and each potential form of assistance in any given country needs to 
be examined in its specific circumstances. It is also true that the criteria we have offered can 
be conceptualised in different ways, and that there may be different views about their com-
parative importance. Nevertheless, it seems clear that several kinds of important consider-
ations point in the same direction and support the view that health interventions ought to 
play a more prominent role in post-conflict assistance: their ability to address urgent needs, 
their favourable distributive effect and their generally high levels of legitimacy make them 
an especially promising area for assistance. More generally, comparisons like these suggest 
that international post-conflict priorities need to be examined more systematically.
The point here is not that transitional justice is unimportant, or that all funding for tran-
sitional justice should be reallocated. Rather, we aim to raise the possibility that policymakers 
need to think strategically about their decisions when allocating funds. This can also help 
to ensure that underperforming initiatives, in transitional justice, health or elsewhere, do 
not strategically avoid rigorous evaluation (Arthur 2018, 235–7). Although transitional justice 
is a worthwhile goal, whether it should constitute a priority for international donors must 
be evaluated in light of its opportunity costs. This invariably involves comparisons with other 
possible forms of assistance. Although there is likely to be disagreement about both the 
comparative merits of different approaches and the criteria by which to judge them, these 
kinds of debate must be addressed more explicitly if international assistance is to fulfil its 
own stated aims successfully.
Three objections
Certain interventions have proven effective in helping post-conflict societies meet their 
most urgent needs, including, for instance, investments in public health. Other initiatives 
have clearly failed. Other cases are more difficult. For example, despite a compelling norma-
tive foundation, international support for transitional justice has often failed to live up to 
expectations. These observations speak to the need for significant reform of how foreign 
donors approach opportunity cost and, potentially, a reconfiguration of donor priorities: 
away from clearly underperforming projects, and towards more promising ones. In this 
section, we consider three objections to this conclusion: (1) there is no agent on the global 
stage that can set the foreign assistance priorities of the international community; (2) 
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transitional justice and health are incommensurable goals; and (3) the way donors assist 
post-conflict societies is their prerogative. We find, ultimately, that none of these objections 
undermines the force of our argument.
The absence of a global agent
The hypothetical example in the preceding section assumed a single agent free to decide 
on the allocation of resources for post-conflict assistance. But one might object that in reality, 
there is no unitary agent on the global stage that allocates resources in a systematic fashion. 
Rather, there is a complicated patchwork of different agents – national donor agencies, 
international organisations, supranational bodies – each with its own priorities, pre-existing 
commitments and areas of expertise. Given this fragmentation, scaling back efforts and 
commitments in one area will not necessarily free up resources for use in other areas. The 
absence of a global agent, so the argument goes, makes it impossible to reconfigure the 
post-conflict priorities of the international community as a whole.
In response to this objection, we acknowledge that there is no central decision-making 
body that can distribute assistance to post-conflict societies. It is also true that if donor 
countries reduced their contributions to the ICC, for instance, the newly available funds 
would not be channelled automatically to other pressing needs in post-conflict societies. 
These facts notwithstanding, our point is that greater reflection and coordination on 
post-conflict assistance would be desirable. All too frequently, aid providers pursue their 
individual goals for idiosyncratic or narrowly strategic reasons, without a broader under-
standing of the consequences of their efforts and the trade-offs at stake. Much like in other 
areas of international cooperation – such as global environmental policy – the lack of a global 
agent creates challenges but does not negate the need to reflect critically on the general 
priorities of the international community.
The incommensurability of assistance goals
Assuming it is reasonable to call for a reconfiguration of priorities in the sense just described, 
someone might still object that it is impossible to compare areas of assistance in any sys-
tematic fashion. The values served by transitional justice and public health are simply incom-
mensurable – that is, they cannot be measured on a single scale (Chang 2013). Internationally 
supported transitional justice is approached and funded as a temporary activity that prom-
ises to punish perpetrators and recompense victims; public health is an ongoing develop-
mental activity that improves the welfare of the population. The two areas follow different 
rationales and purposes, and neither is inherently more valuable than the other. As such, 
the objection goes, comparing different areas of assistance is like comparing apples and 
oranges.
Again, we do not deny that any form of comparison is hard. Take one of the criteria for 
comparative assessments mentioned before, the impact of alternative interventions. If the 
values of peace, justice or health cannot be measured on a single scale, then post-conflict 
priority-setting cannot be reduced to an exercise in utilitarian sum-ranking. And yet, it is 
impossible to deny that impact is a central consideration when weighing alternative courses 
of action under conditions of scarcity. even if measured only using their own internal logic 
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– the extent to which they achieve their own stated aims – efforts to assist post-conflict 
societies must stand a reasonable chance of success to be justified in light of their oppor-
tunity costs. Otherwise, scare resources could be better allocated elsewhere.
It is possible that transitional justice ideals could be incorporated into the pursuit of 
health, for instance, by targeting health initiatives to address harms resulting from conflict, 
or by rebuilding crucial health facilities damaged by conflict. likewise, establishing a more 
just legal order, and ensuring access to it, can dramatically improve people’s overall quality 
of life, including their health. But when these synergies are not possible, we must often make 
choices between incommensurable or incomparable values. ultimately, any government 
must decide how much of its budget is spent on culture, say, and how much on police work. 
There is no single correct answer to indicate the right balance, and governments ideally rely 
on their democratic legitimacy in making these choices. In the case of post-conflict assis-
tance, existing priorities – whether they are unplanned or set deliberately – must also be 
publicly scrutinised and debated. There is likely to be disagreement about the values at 
stake, the criteria to assess them, and the right balance to be struck. But this, we argue, 
merely shows the need for more academic and policy discussion.
The prerogatives of donors
Consider a final objection. One might object that since donor countries commit resources 
to the stabilisation and reconstruction of post-conflict societies voluntarily, they are free to 
decide how to invest these resources. They are, of course, not free to provide ‘assistance’ that 
results in harm to people in host societies or undermines important societal goals. But 
beyond these constraints, the objection goes, it is their prerogative to support, say, transi-
tional justice measures rather than population health.
A first response to this objection is to scrutinise the assumption that post-conflict assistance 
is supererogatory – that is, praiseworthy but not a stringent moral obligation. As has long been 
recognised by just war theorists (Bass 2004), parties directly and indirectly involved in conflict 
incur special obligations to help ensure a successful transition to peace. But even absent any 
special obligations, it is plausible to hold that the international community as a whole shares a 
collective obligation to assist. This obligation can be grounded, for instance, on a moral imperative 
to help secure human rights and a duty of assistance to burdened societies (Pattision 2015). If 
there is a collective duty to assist post-conflict societies, then surely that duty must be discharged 
in ways that can be justified on reasonable grounds to host societies. At minimum, this implies 
a commitment to effective assistance. Indeed, clear commitments to effectiveness, efficiency 
and legitimacy have repeatedly been made by the donor community (OeCD 2005, 2008).
But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that post-conflict assistance is supererogatory. 
Would donors then enjoy unfettered discretion over how they provide assistance? Not nec-
essarily. As philosophers have recognised, agents can have a ‘duty to do something condi-
tional on them being willing to expend a cost, even if they otherwise had no duty to expend 
that cost’ (Oberman 2019, 208). In other words, while donors may have no prior duty to assist, 
once they commit to providing assistance, they may incur ‘conditional duties’ to assist in 
justifiable ways. If one form of assistance promises little benefit to the host society, and 
alternative interventions would achieve much better outcomes, a compelling case exists for 
donors to reform or reconfigure their assistance.
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Conclusion
As long as there are conflicts, there will be difficult choices regarding post-conflict rebuilding 
and reconstruction. These decisions have immense life-or-death consequences for millions 
of people worldwide. When the challenges of establishing an enduring post-conflict order 
cannot be sufficiently addressed by domestic actors alone, there is a compelling need for 
international support to help consolidate peace and support recovery. Yet even the most 
robust, well-funded international assistance efforts face resource scarcity. Tough choices 
must be made and trade-offs between multiple priorities are often inevitable.
By focussing on the costs and opportunity costs of post-conflict assistance, we have 
argued for the need to think more systematically about aid allocation. Clearly this demands 
credible monitoring and evaluation and an end to funding initiatives that are ineffective or 
even counterproductive. The concept of opportunity cost may also help illuminate tough 
choices. We have illustrated that this is possible by looking at the hard case of transitional 
justice; it is undoubtedly an important aspiration for societies that deal with the legacy of 
conflict, but existing initiatives need to be scrutinised carefully, and potentially reformed or 
reconceptualised, in light of their empirical record and their costs. Other areas of international 
assistance may deserve more attention. We have argued that public health interventions, 
though by no means guaranteed to succeed in every case, harbour great potential to improve 
the lives of post-conflict populations.
What international priorities should be, and how assistance should be structured, will 
invariably be controversial. It is conceptually, normatively and empirically difficult to compare 
vastly different post-conflict goals, such as transitional justice and public health. This is espe-
cially true given that, in practice, international post-conflict assistance is fragmented among 
different bodies that pursue idiosyncratic goals, over different time frames, with varying 
degrees of success. Nevertheless, existing priorities and practices cannot be accepted uncrit-
ically. Assistance in post-conflict settings needs to be designed and delivered in ways that 
are justifiable to the affected communities, and to that end we must consider competing 
priorities more systematically.
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Notes
 1. For example, the united Kingdom announced nearly £3 billion in aid cuts (BBC News 2020).
 2. On the concept of opportunity cost, see Newman (2017).
 3. Donor motives can include promoting economic and geopolitical interests, in addition to 
helping societies recover from violent conflict. Mixed motives do not render the evalua-
tion and comparison of aid expenditures fruitless or impossible, but rather underscore the 
need to measure assistance efforts against the goal of optimally assisting post-conflict 
societies.
 4. even William easterly (2006, 375), perhaps the most prominent sceptic of international aid, has 
endorsed such initiatives.
 5. For example, aid may bolster an unsavoury regime. These concerns are real and must be eval-
uated on a case-by-case basis. Assuming the health aid is effective, lives are being saved. 
Nevertheless, certain regimes may be so heinous that international donors could be justified in 
withholding support.
 6. SIGAR’s extensive reporting on uS assistance to Afghanistan can be found at https://www.si-
gar.mil/
 7. For a list of truth and reconciliation commission budgets, see hayner (2010, appendix 2, 268–73).
 8. For an overview of international monetary contributions, see Muck and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 
(2016).
 9. even within the justice sector, donors must choose whether to fund transitional justice, ordi-
nary justice or initiatives focused on non-state justice (Swenson 2018).
ORCID
Geoffrey Swenson  http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6477-4257
Johannes Kniess  http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5885-2324
Bibliography
Addison, A., and T. Brück. 2009. “The Multi-Dimensional Challenge of Mass Violent Conflict.” In Making 
Peace Work, edited by T. Addison and T. Brück, 1–14. New York: Palgrave MacMillian.
Alonso, A., and R. Brugha. 2006. “Rehabilitating the health System after Conflict in east Timor: A Shift 
from NGO to Government leadership.” Health Policy and Planning 21 (3): 206–216. doi:10.1093/
heapol/czl006.
Andrieu, K. 2010.  “Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the liberal Paradigm.” 
Security Dialogue 41 (5): 537–558. doi:10.1177/0967010610382109.
Appel, B. 2018. “In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court: Does the ICC Deter human Rights 
Violations?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1177/0022002716639101.
Arthur, P. 2018. “Why Do Donors Choose to Fund Transitional Justice?.” In Transitional Justice, 
International Assistance, and Civil Society: Missed Connections, edited by P. Arthur and C. Yakinthou, 
209–241. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.
Arthur, P., and C. Yakinthou. 2018. “Changing Contexts of International Assistance to Transitional 
Justice.” In Transitional Justice, International Assistance, and Civil Society: Missed Connections, edited 
by P. Arthur and C. Yakinthou, 1–24. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.
ThIRD WORlD QuARTeRlY 1711
Banerjee, A., and e. Duflo. 2011. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty. 
New York: Public Affairs.
Banerjee, A., and R. he. 2008. “Making Aid Work.” In Reinventing Foreign Aid, edited by N. Birdsall and 
W. easterly, 47–92. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bass, G. 2004. “Jus Post Bellum.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (4): 384–412. doi:10.1111/j. 
1088-4963.2004.00019.x.
Baylis, e. 2008. “Tribunal-hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies.” Oregon Review of 
International Law 10: 361–390.
Baylis, e. 2017. “Transitional Justice and Development Aid to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: 
Risks and Reforms.” In Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies, 
edited by R. Duthie and P. Seils, 370–402. New York: ICTJ.
BBC News. 2003. “Interview with Carla del Ponte.” Accessed 30 April 2021. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
radio4/news/un/transcripts/carla_delponte.shtml
BBC News. 2020. “Coronavirus: uK Foreign Aid Spending Cut by £2.9bn amid economic Downturn.” 
Accessed 30 April 2021. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-53508933
Bendavid, e., and J. Bhattacharya. 2014. “The Relationship of health Aid to Population health 
Improvements.” JAMA Internal Medicine 174 (6): 881–887. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.292.
Bhargava, A., D. T. Jamison, l. J. lau, and C. J. l. Murray. 2001. “Modeling the effects of health on 
economic Growth.” Journal of Health Economics 20 (3): 423–440. doi:10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00073-X.
Brinkerhoff, D. W. 2005. “Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post‐Conflict Societies: Core 
Concepts and Cross‐Cutting Themes.” Public Administration and Development 25 (1): 3–14. 
doi:10.1002/pad.352.
Brounéus, K. 2010. “The Trauma of Truth Telling: effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on 
Psychological health.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (3): 408–437. doi:10.1177/0022002709360322.
Chakravarty, A. 2016. Investing in Authoritarian Rule: Punishment and Patronage in Rwanda’s Gacaca 
Courts for Genocide Crimes. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.
Chang, R. 2013. “Incommensurability (and Incomparability).” In The International Encyclopedia of 
Ethics, edited by h. laFollette, 2591–2604. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ciorciari, J., and A. heindel. 2014. Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 
Ann Arbor: university of Michigan Press.
Clark, P. 2010. The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without 
Lawyers. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.
Clements, P. 2020. “Improving learning and Accountability in Foreign Aid.” World Development 125: 
104670. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104670.
Collier, P., and A. hoeffler. 2004. “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies.” European 
Economic Review 48 (5): 1125–1145. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.11.005.
Currie, J., and T. Vogl. 2013. “early-life health and Adult Circumstance in Developing Countries.” 
Annual Review of Economics 5 (1): 1–36. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-081412-103704.
Dietrich, S. 2011. “The Politics of Public health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments have Incentives to 
Implement Aid effectively.” World Development 39 (1): 55–63. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.06.011.
Donaubauer, J., D. herzer, and P. Nunnenkamp. 2019. “The effectiveness of Aid under Post-Conflict 
Conditions: A Sector-Specific Analysis.” The Journal of Development Studies 55 (4): 720–736. doi:10.
1080/00220388.2017.1400013.
Duursma, A., and T. R. Müller. 2019. “The ICC Indictment against Al-Bashir and Its Repercussions for 
Peacekeeping and humanitarian Operations in Darfur.” Third World Quarterly 40 (5): 890–907. 
doi:10.1080/01436597.2019.1579640.
easterly, W. 2006. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill 
and so Little Good. New York: Penguin.
Ford, S. 2018. “A hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts.” Minnesota Journal of 
International Law 27: 179–244.
Gberi, l. 2014. “The Special Court for Sierra leone Rests – For Good.” https://www.un.org/africarenew-
al/magazine/april-2014/special-court-sierra-leone-rests-%e2%80%93-good (last accessed 30 April 
2021)
1712 G. SWeNSON AND J. KNIeSS
Ghani, A., and C. lockhart. 2009. Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World. 
Oxford: Oxford university Press.
Ghobarah, h. A., P. huth, and B. Russett. 2004. “The Post-War Public health effects of Civil Conflict.” 
Social Science & Medicine 59: 869–884. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2003.11.043.
Gibson, J. l. 2006. “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 603 (1): 82–110. doi:10.1177/0002716205282895.
Girod, D. 2015. Explaining Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Oxford: Oxford university Press.
Gulrajani, N. 2017.  “Bilateral Donors and the Age of the National Interest: What Prospects for Challenge 
by Development Agencies?” World Development 96: 375–389. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.021.
Gyimah-Brempong, K. 2015. “Do African Countries Get health from health Aid?” Journal of African 
Development 17 (2): 83–114.
haar, R., and l. Rubenstein. 2012. Health in Postconflict and Fragile States. Washington, DC: uSIP.
hayden, R. M. 2011. “What’s Reconciliation Got to Do with It? The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as Antiwar Profiteer.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5 (3): 
313–330. doi:10.1080/17502977.2011.595597.
hayner, P. B. 2010. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. 2nd 
ed. london: Routledge.
hoeffler, A., and M. Reynal-Querol. 2003. Measuring the Costs of Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank.
hoffman, e. 2008. “Reconciliation in Sierra leone: local Processes Yield Global lessons.” Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs 32: 129–142.
ICC. 2020. Proposed Programme Budget for 2021 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/19/10/AV.
ICC. 2021. “Facts and Figures.” Accessed 7 April 2021. https://www.icc-cpi.int/about
Iqbal, Z. 2006. “health and human Security: The Public health Impact of Violent Conflict.” International 
Studies Quarterly 50 (3): 631–649. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00417.x.
Jalloh, C. C. 2011. “Special Court for Sierra leone: Achieving Justice?” Michigan Journal of International 
Law 32: 395–460.
Jo, h., and B. Simmons. 2016. “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” International 
Organization 70 (3): 443–475. doi:10.1017/S0020818316000114.
Jones, S. G, l. h. hilborne, C. Ross Anthony, l. M. Davis, and F. Girosi. 2006. Securing Health: Lessons 
from Nation-Building Missions. Santa Monica: Rand.
Kendall, S. 2011. “Donors’ Justice: Recasting International Criminal Accountability.” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 24 (3): 585–606. doi:10.1017/S0922156511000264.
Kent, l. 2012. “Interrogating the “Gap” between law and Justice: east Timor’s Serious Crimes Process.” 
Human Rights Quarterly 34 (4): 1021–1044. doi:10.1353/hrq.2012.0059.
Khalid, h., S. Gill, and A. M. Fox. 2019. “Global Aid for Nutrition-Specific and Nutrition-Sensitive 
Interventions and Proportion of Stunted Children across low-and Middle-Income Countries: Does 
Aid Matter?” Health Policy and Planning 34 (Supplement_2): ii18–ii27. doi:10.1093/heapol/czz106.
Kim, N. K., and M. h. hong. 2019. “Politics of Pursuing Justice in the Aftermath of Civil Conflict.” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 63 (5): 1165–1192. doi:10.1177/0022002718788926.
Kotsadam, A., G. Østby, S. A. Rustad, A. F. Tollefsen, and h. urdal. 2018. “Development Aid and Infant 
Mortality: Micro-level evidence from Nigeria.” World Development 105: 59–69. doi:10.1016/j.world-
dev.2017.12.022.
Krcmaric, D. 2018. “Should I Stay or Should I Go? leaders, exile, and the Dilemmas of International 
Justice.” American Journal of Political Science 62 (2): 486–498. doi:10.1111/ajps.12352.
Kruk, M., l. P. Freedman, G. A. Anglin, and R. J. Waldman. 2010. “Rebuilding health Systems to Improve 
health and Promote Statebuilding in Post-Conflict Countries: A Theoretical Framework and 
Research Agenda.” Social Science & Medicine 70: 89–97. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.09.042.
leithead, A. 2015. “Rwanda Genocide: International Tribunal Closes.” BBC News. Accessed 9 July 2019. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35070220
Mani, R. 2008. “Dilemmas of expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional 
Justice and Development.” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (3): 253–265. doi:10.1093/
ijtj/ijn030.
ThIRD WORlD QuARTeRlY 1713
Mayer-Rieckh, A., and h. Varney. 2019. Recommending Change: Truth Commission Recommendations 
on Institutional Reforms: An Overview. Geneva: DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector 
Governance.
McAuliffe, P. 2011. “hybrid Tribunals at Ten: how International Criminal Justice’s Golden Child Became 
an Orphan.” Journal of International Law and International Relations 7: 1–65.
McCargo, D. 2015. “Transitional Justice and Its Discontents.” Journal of Democracy 26 (2): 5–20. 
doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0022.
Mcevoy, K. 2007. “Beyond legalism: Towards a Thicker understanding of Transitional Justice.” Journal 
of Law and Society 34 (4): 411–440. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6478.2007.00399.x.
Mendeloff, D. 2009. “Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and emotional effects of 
Post-Conflict Justice.” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (3): 592–623. doi:10.1353/hrq.0.0100.
Mills, K., and A. Bloomfield. 2018. “African Resistance to the International Criminal Court: halting the 
Advance of the anti-Impunity Norm.” Review of International Studies 44 (1): 101–127. doi:10.1017/
S0260210517000407.
Mishra, P., and D. Newhouse. 2009. “Does health Aid Matter?” Journal of Health Economics 28 (4): 855–
872. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.05.004.
Muck, W., and e. Wiebelhaus-Brahm. 2016. “external Transitional Justice Funding: Introducing a New 
Dataset.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 11 (2): 66–71. doi:10.1080/15423166.2016.1183509.
Murdie, A., and A. hicks. 2013. “Can International Nongovernmental Organizations Boost Government 
Services? The Case of health.” International Organization 67 (3): 541–573. doi:10.1017/
S0020818313000143.
Mydans, S. 2017. “11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Worth It?” 
New York Times. Accessed 30 April 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/asia/cam-
bodia-khmer-rouge-united-nations-tribunal.html
Ndikumana, l., and l. Pickbourn. 2017. “The Impact of Foreign Aid Allocation on Access to Social 
Services in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Water and Sanitation.” World Development 90: 104–114. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.09.001.
Newbrander, W., P. Ickx, F. Feroz, and h. Stanekzai. 2014. “Afghanistan’s Basic Package of health 
Services: Its Development and effects on Rebuilding the health System.” Global Public Health 9 
(sup1): S6–S28.  doi:10.1080/17441692.2014.916735.
Newman, J. 2017. “Contemporary Debates on Opportunity Cost Theory and Pedagogy.” In The 
Economic Theory of Costs: Foundations and New Directions, edited by M. McCaffrey, 11–26. london: 
Routledge.
Oberman, K. 2019. “War and Poverty.” Philosophical Studies 176 (1): 197–217. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-
1012-4.
OeCD. 2005. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Paris: OeCD Publishing. doi:10.1787/9789264098084-en.
OeCD. 2008. Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Paris: OeCD Publishing.
Olsen, T. D., l. A. Payne, and A. G. Reiter. 2010. Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, 
Weighing Efficacy. Washington, DC: uSIP.
Pattision, J. 2015. “Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild.” British Journal of Political 
Science 4 (3): 635–661. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000331.
Pickbourn, l., and l. Ndikumana. 2016. “The Impact of the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Aid on 
Gender Inequality.” Journal of International Development 28 (3): 396–411. doi:10.1002/jid.3213.
Pickbourn, l., and l. Ndikumana. 2019. “Does health Aid Reduce Infant and Child Mortality from 
Diarrhoea in Sub-Saharan Africa?” The Journal of Development Studies 55 (10): 2212–2231. 
doi:10.1080/00220388.2018.1536264.
Plümper, T., and e. Neumayer. 2006. “The unequal Burden of War: The effect of Armed Conflict on the 
Gender Gap in life expectancy.” International Organization 60 (3): 723–754. doi:10.1017/
S0020818306060231.
Prorok, A. 2016. “leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes.” American Journal of Political Science 60 
(1): 70–84. doi:10.1111/ajps.12199.
Prorok, A. 2017. “The (in)Compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and 
Civil Conflict Termination.” International Organization 71 (2): 213–243. doi:10.1017/
S0020818317000078.
1714 G. SWeNSON AND J. KNIeSS
Rubenstein, l. 2011. “Post‐Conflict health Reconstruction: Search for a Policy.” Disasters 35 (4): 680–
700. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2011.01237.x.
Santa Barbara, J., and G. MacQueen. 2004. “Peace through health: Key Concepts.” The Lancet 364 
(9431): 384–386. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(04)16729-9.
Sen, A. 2004. “Why health equity?.” In Public Health, Ethics, and Equity, edited by S. Anand, F. Peter, and 
A. Sen, 21–33. Oxford: Oxford university Press.
Sikkink, K. 2011. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics. New 
York: WW Norton & Company.
Ssenyonjo, M. 2018. “State Withdrawal Notifications from the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: South Africa, Burundi and the Gambia.” Criminal Law Forum 29 (1): 63–119. 
doi:10.1007/s10609-017-9321-z.
Steflja, I. 2018. “Internationalised Justice and Democratisation: how International Tribunals 
Can empower Non-Reformists.” Third World Quarterly 39 (9): 1675–1691. doi:10.1080/01436597. 
2018.1447370.
Swenson, G. 2017. “Why u.S. efforts to Promote the Rule of law in Afghanistan Failed.” International 
Security 42 (1): 114–151. doi:10.1162/ISeC_a_00285.
Swenson, G. 2018. “The Promise and Peril of Paralegal Aid.” World Development 106: 51–63. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.01.017.
Teitel, R. 2003. “Transitional Justice Genealogy.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16: 69–94.
Teitel, R. 2008. “editorial Note-Transitional Justice Globalized.” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 2 (1): 1–4. doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijm041.
The Guardian. 2020. “Australia Slashes Pacific Aid Funding for health as Region Battles Medical Crises.” 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/18/australia-slashes-pacific-aid-fund-
ing-for-health-as-region-battles-medical-crises (last accessed 30 April 2021)
Thoms, O. N. T., J. Ron, and R. Paris. 2010. “State-level effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We 
Know?” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4 (3): 329–354. doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijq012.
uN General Assembly. 1948. “The universal Declaration of human Rights.”
uN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. “The ICTR in Brief.” Accessed 9 July 2019. http://
unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal
uSIP. 2008. Transitional Justice: Information Handbook. Washington, DC: uSIP.
uvin, P. 2001. “Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in 
Rwanda after the Genocide.” Third World Quarterly 22 (2): 177–189. doi:10.1080/01436590120043291.
Valentino, B. 2011. “The True Costs of humanitarian Intervention-The hard Truth about a Noble 
Notion.” Foreign Affairs 90: 60–73.
Vinjamuri, l., and J. Snyder. 2015. “law and Politics in Transitional Justice.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 18 (1): 303–327. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-122013-110512.
Wilson, S. e. 2011. “Chasing Success: health Sector Aid and Mortality.” World Development 39 (11): 
2032–2043. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.021.
World Bank. 2010. “Report No: ICR00001396.” http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
274111468100758409/pdf/ICR13960P074121e0only1910BOX353791B.pdf
Yogo, u. l., and D. Mallaye. 2015. “health Aid and health Improvement in Sub‐Saharan Africa: 
Accounting for the heterogeneity between Stable States and Post‐Conflict States.” Journal of 
International Development 27 (7): 1178–1196. doi:10.1002/jid.3034.
